Communication and language of animal
Earth’s earliest organisms evolved primitive mechanisms of exchange capable of informing of species, gender and intent.
This convenience occurred through what was then nature’s most sophisticated medium: chemo-communication.
Continuous need over millions of year to contact another of the same evolving species in order to procreate necessitated ever more complex methods of communication.
Out of this evolutionary process ‘language’ in its broadest sense was born.
Each type of language used in native differs. The deeper one probes, the more one discovers each species’ communicative ability distinguished by ever more elaborate definitions of the concept ‘language’.
In its simplest definition, language signifies ‘medium of information exchange’. The definition allows the concept of language to encompass facial expressions, gestures, posture, whistles, hand signs, writing, mathematical language, programming (or computer) language and so forth.
The definition also accommodates the ants’ chemical ‘language’ and the honey bees’ dance ‘language’.
The definition further recognized the many bioacoustics exchanges of information (the sound emissions of life forms) that occur in frequencies beyond human hearing.
For example, an average 25 year old human can hear only about ten octaves at the loudness and closeness of normal conversation – that is, between 30 and 18 000 hertz.
Birds, frogs, toads, and dogs all vocalize within this range. However, most other creatures appear to communicate both below and above the range humans consider ‘normal’.
Infrasound comprise emissions below 30 hertz such as many sounds made by finback whales, blue whales, elephants, crocodilian, oceans waves, volcanoes, earthquakes and severe weather.
Ultrasound occurs above 28 000 hertz, frequencies, commonly used by insects, bats, dolphins and shrews.
There is far more to language than vocal communication alone, however. In its most universal meaning, language is the nexus of the animate word, its limit drawn only by humankind’s crayon.
Communication and language of animal
Friday, August 13, 2010
Saturday, June 26, 2010
The Language of Emotions
The Language of Emotions
The language of emotions has most often been studied as part of a larger subset of language, typically referred to as “internal state language.”
Some investigators have focused exclusively on the emotion lexicon or in the lexicon of desire (subset of volition and ability), feeling (positive and negative emotion), an metal state or other subsets.
These semantic subcategories are quite heterogenous and all findings must be interpreted in the context of the specific definitions used.
Many words of English which can refer to emotions or other internal states have multiple meanings, only some of which are relevant here.
For example, the word like may refer to an emotional state or a judgment of similarity; the word blue to an emotional state or a color; and the word can to ability/permission or to a container.
For this reason, observational studies of internal state language require careful examination of potential internal state words in context, and parental checklists require the specification of the relevant meaning.
Although the vocabulary of emotions and other internal states is extensive and distinctive these words have no distinctive grammatical correlate or pronunciation.
Thus this aspect of language is not specifically marked in any way for children, despite the very considerable challenge such words pose.
These words are relatively abstract: most of them do not have a clear, consistent, visible referent.
Even in those cases which do have a visible referent such as happy and mad, it is transitory an somewhat idiosyncratic across individuals.
Furthermore, the essence as well as the self. Such as act of categorization would appear to require a high degree of non-egocentrism, on the part of the child to infer an internal state for another.
Reassert in internal state language did not begin until relatively recently, in part because of the assumption that such non-egocentrism would not be reliably established until the concrete operational period i.e. the early school years.
Finally, the processes that have been posited to enable children to master an enourmous vocabulary in the preschool years have a little to offer in this area of learning.
For example, the taxonomic constraint has been proposed as a pre-existing bias to apply labels to categories of similar objects, and the principle of mutual exclusively has been proposed as a bias to assume that a new refers to a new object or set of objects. Neither appears to be particular relevant for internal state language.
The Language of Emotions
The language of emotions has most often been studied as part of a larger subset of language, typically referred to as “internal state language.”
Some investigators have focused exclusively on the emotion lexicon or in the lexicon of desire (subset of volition and ability), feeling (positive and negative emotion), an metal state or other subsets.
These semantic subcategories are quite heterogenous and all findings must be interpreted in the context of the specific definitions used.
Many words of English which can refer to emotions or other internal states have multiple meanings, only some of which are relevant here.
For example, the word like may refer to an emotional state or a judgment of similarity; the word blue to an emotional state or a color; and the word can to ability/permission or to a container.
For this reason, observational studies of internal state language require careful examination of potential internal state words in context, and parental checklists require the specification of the relevant meaning.
Although the vocabulary of emotions and other internal states is extensive and distinctive these words have no distinctive grammatical correlate or pronunciation.
Thus this aspect of language is not specifically marked in any way for children, despite the very considerable challenge such words pose.
These words are relatively abstract: most of them do not have a clear, consistent, visible referent.
Even in those cases which do have a visible referent such as happy and mad, it is transitory an somewhat idiosyncratic across individuals.
Furthermore, the essence as well as the self. Such as act of categorization would appear to require a high degree of non-egocentrism, on the part of the child to infer an internal state for another.
Reassert in internal state language did not begin until relatively recently, in part because of the assumption that such non-egocentrism would not be reliably established until the concrete operational period i.e. the early school years.
Finally, the processes that have been posited to enable children to master an enourmous vocabulary in the preschool years have a little to offer in this area of learning.
For example, the taxonomic constraint has been proposed as a pre-existing bias to apply labels to categories of similar objects, and the principle of mutual exclusively has been proposed as a bias to assume that a new refers to a new object or set of objects. Neither appears to be particular relevant for internal state language.
The Language of Emotions
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